Survey data

Abstract: I test the credit-market effects of housing wealth shocks by estimating the consumption elasticity of house price shocks among households in different age quintiles. Younger households face faster expected income growth and hence would like to borrow more than older households. I estimate consumption elasticities from housing wealth by age quintile to be {4; 0; 3; 8; 3} percent. As predicted by theory, the youngest group has a higher elasticity of consumption than the next two age quintiles.

Abstract: Economists disagree whether the recent increase in credit card debt has been detrimental to U.S. households. However, many rely on a measure of revolving credit published by the Federal Reserve, which captures transactions in which a credit card is used because of its advantages over cash or a check. An increase in debt stemming from such convenience use likely would not signal greater financial vulnerabiltiy for households.

Abstract: The key feature of the modern U.S. personal bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a financial fresh start through debt discharge. The primary justification for the discharge policy is to preserve human capital by maintaining incentives for work. In this paper, we test this fresh start argument by providing the first estimate of the effect of personal bankruptcy filing on the labor supply using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).

Abstract: Using a unique set of household level panel data, we estimate the effect of capital gains on saving by asset type, controlling for observable and unobservable household specific fixed effects. The results suggest that the decline in the personal saving rate since 1984 is largely due to the significant capital gains in corporate equities experienced over this period. Over five-year periods, the effect of capital gains in corporate equities on saving is substantially larger than the effect of capital gains in housing or other assets.

This paper investigates three common differences among defined contribution plans that may lead to varying degrees of information overload. We hypothesize that information overload is one reason participants in defined contribution plans often choose the default options. In two experiments, we manipulate the display of the investment information, the number of choices offered, and the similarity between the investment options offered. In addition, we measure all of the participants’ financial knowledge and include this measure as an independent variable in the study.

This report presents the results of a study that uses a controlled experiment with over 500 recent mortgage customers to examine the mortgage broker compensation disclosure proposed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as part of its July 2002 RESPA reform proposal. The focus of the disclosure is on any “yield spread premium” paid by the lender to the broker for loans originated with “above par” interest rates.

Abstract: This paper explores the significance of unobservable default risk in mortgage and automobile loan markets. I develop and estimate a two-period model that allows for heterogeneous forms of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard. Controlling for income levels, loan size and risk aversion, I find robust evidence of adverse selection, with borrowers self-selecting into contracts with varying interest rates and collateral requirements. For example, ex-post higher-risk borrowers pledge less collateral and pay higher interest rates.