Administrative data

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency.

Conventional wisdom holds that individuals who have gone bankrupt face difficulties getting credit for at least some time. However, there is very little non-survey based empirical evidence on the availability of credit post-bankruptcy and its dependence on the credit cycle. Using data from one of the largest credit bureaus in the US, this paper makes three contributions. First, we show that individuals who file for bankruptcy are indeed penalized with limited credit access post-bankruptcy, but we find that this consequence is very short lived.

This paper takes a skeptical look at a leading argument about what is causing the foreclosure crisis and what should be done to stop it. We use an economic model to focus on two key decisions: the borrower’s choice to default on the mortgage and the lender’s choice on whether to renegotiate or “modify” the loan. The theoretical model and econometric analysis illustrate that “unaffordable” loans, defined as those with high mortgage payments relative to income at origination, are unlikely to be the main reason that borrowers decide to default.

Abstract: The main factors underlying the rise in mortgage defaults appear to be declines in house prices and deteriorated underwriting standards, in particular an increase in loan-to-value ratios and in the share of mortgages with little or no documentation of income.

Using a large sample of individual credit information provided by a US credit bureau, this paper investigates the empirical relevance of stigma and information sharing on household bankruptcy and its trend. Many observers of bankruptcy patterns have conjectured that there exists an increased willingness to default that reflects a diminution of social stigma. In this paper, we use a new methodology to disentangle stigma and social learning—two acknowledgedly important social factors affecting default.

Despite the growing importance of housing counseling, there is little systematic information about the industry. The industry is known to be marked by significant diversity in a number of dimensions, including the types of organizations involved, their organizational capacity, the types of clients served, the types of services delivered, and the funding sources used. The primary goal of this study is to provide a systematic overview of the housing counseling industry as of 2007.

Abstract: We explore the types of data used to characterize risky subprime lending and consider the geographic dispersion of subprime lending. First, we describe the strengths and weaknesses of three different datasets on subprime mortgages using information from LoanPerformance, HUD, and HMDA. These datasets embody different definitions of subprime mortgages. We show that estimates of the number of subprime originations are somewhat sensitive to which types of mortgages are categorized as subprime.

Millions of Americans have negative housing equity, meaning that the outstanding balance on their mortgage exceeds their home’s current market value. Our data show that the overwhelming majority of these households will not lose their homes. Our finding is consistent with historical evidence: we examine more than 100,000 homeowners in Massachusetts who had negative equity during the early 1990s and find that fewer than 10 percent of these owners eventually lost their home to foreclosure.

This study presents findings on how much Federal Housing Administration (FHA) borrowers pay in closing costs when they buy a house, how much these costs vary, and factors to which the variation is related. The analysis uses data from a national sample of 7,560 FHA-insured, 30-year fixed-rate home purchase loans closed in May and June of 2001.

Using a variety of datasets, we document some basic facts about the current subprime crisis. Many of these facts are applicable to the crisis at a national level, while some illustrate problems relevant only to Massachusetts and New England. We conclude by discussing some outstanding questions about which the data, we believe, are not yet conclusive.